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Guns and Dictum: Is the Fifth Circuit's Finding of an
Individual Right Under the Second Amendment Dictum or
Holding?
After Timothy Emerson's wife filed for divorce, he was
temporarily enjoined from, inter alia, threatening harm to her.' The
issuing court made no express finding that Emerson posed a credible
threat of harm.2 He subsequently was charged with possession of a
firearm3 under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), 4 which prohibits possession
while under such an injunction.5 The federal district court dismissed
the indictment on Second Amendment grounds, finding that the
Second Amendment 6 conferred an individual right to keep and bear
arms and that § 922(g)(8) was unconstitutional on its face for
disarming a citizen without a particularized finding of a credible
threat.7

1. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 211 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct.
2362 (2002) (mem.).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 212.
4. Section 922(g)(8) provides in relevant part:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person(8) who is subject to a court order that(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at
which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate
partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in
other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily
injury to the partner or child; and
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the
physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be
expected to cause bodily injury;...
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2000).
5. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 212.
6. The Second Amendment provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
7. United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 611 (N.D. Tex. 1999), rev'd, 270
F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002) (mem.).
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On October 16, 2001, the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Emerson8 reversed the district court, finding that although the Second
Amendment does confer an individual right, § 922(g)(8)'s restriction
of that right is constitutional. 9 With this ruling, the Fifth Circuit
became the first circuit court to recognize an individual Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms. ° In a special concurrence,
however, Judge Robert Parker argued that the individual right
determination is dictum because it "is entirely unnecessary to resolve
this case and has no bearing on the judgment."" This Recent
Development argues that the Fifth Circuit's individual right
determination was not dictum, but holding under both descriptive and
prescriptive tests suggested by the case law of the Supreme Court and
the Fifth Circuit, and proffers a rubric for testing necessity under the
prescriptive test.
To evaluate Judge Parker's criticism, the line between dictum
and holding must be clarified. Judge Richard Posner has pointed out
that definitions of dictum are "somewhat inconsistent, somewhat
vague, and somewhat circular."'" Black's Law Dictionary defines
"obiter dictum" (literally "something said in passing") as "[a] judicial
comment ...that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and
therefore not precedential,"' 3 and defines "holding" as "a court's
determination of a matter of law pivotal to its decision."' 4 Though
the descriptions "unnecessary" and "pivotal" will prove to be vague
in application, insofar as what is unnecessary is not pivotal, and what
is pivotal is not unnecessary, holding and dictum complement each
other; a particular determination by a court is either holding or
dictum, but not both." Holding can be distinguished from ratio
decidendi ("ratio") (literally "the reason for deciding"), which Black's
defines as "[t]he rule of law on which a court's decision is founded."' 6
This distinction is made particularly salient considering Black's earlier
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002) (mem.).
Id. at 265-66.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 272 (Parker, J., specially concurring).
United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (9th Cir. 1988).

13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1100 (7th ed. 1999).

14. Id. at 737.
15. See STANISLAW

POMORSKI, AMERICAN COMMON LAW AND THE PRINCIPLE
NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE 43 (2d ed. 1975). Pomorski explains the complementary

natures of dictum and ratio, id. ("Starting from a negative assumption it may be said that
any general proposition of law contained in the decision of the court which is not ratio is
dictum."), identifying ratio with holding. Id. at 39. See infra note 18 and accompanying
text.
16. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 1269.

2003]

GUNS AND DICTUM

855

definition of ratio as "[t]he rule of law on which a court says its

decision is founded." 7 Ratio might be dictum or holding depending
on the particular definitions of holding and ratio applied, and on
whether a court has accurately identified the rule of law upon which
its decision is necessarily founded.
The difference between ratio and holding, if any exists, is
confusing.18 Courts and commentators typically use ratio and holding
interchangeably,19 though some commentators recognize the
distinction implied in Black's varying definitions.2" This confusion
stems in part from a technique for deriving the ratio (as equivalent to
holding) of a case proposed by influential English scholar Eugene
Wambaugh21 and from the response to an elaboration on that
technique by Professor A.L. Goodhart.22 Wambaugh proposed that a
legal proposition from a case is dictum if the negation of that
proposition would not change the case's ultimate outcome, i.e.,
affirmed or reversed.23 Goodhart added that the ratio test should
17. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 522 (Pocket ed. 1996) (emphasis added).
18. See Michael Sean Quinn, Argument and Authority in Common Law Advocacy and
Adjudication: An Irreducible Pluralism of Principles, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 655, 712
(1999).
19. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 469 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Dalton v.
Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 470 (1994); United States v. Dixon, 504 U.S. 688, 718 (1993)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Foucha v. Louisiana, 509 U.S. 71,
108 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); POMORSKI, supra note 15, at 39; Mark Alan Thurmon,
When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality
Decisions,42 DUKE L.J. 419,423 (1992).
20. See RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 72 (4th ed.
1991); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, LEARNING THE LAW 75 (11th ed. 1982); Raj Bhala, The
Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Three of a
Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 873, 945 (2001); Christopher Hawthorne,
Note, "Deific Decree": The Short, Happy Life of a Pseudo-Doctrine, 33 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 1755, 1789 (2000).
21. EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES 17-18 (2d ed. 1894).

22. Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J.
161, 173-80 (1930); see Thurmon, supra note 19, at 423-26 (discussing Goodhart's
emphasis on the importance of a judge's reasoning in applying Wambaugh's more
functional test of necessity).
23. Wambaugh described his test as follows:
In order to make the test, let him first frame carefully the supposed proposition
of law. Let him then insert in the proposition a word reversing its meaning. Let
him then inquire whether, if the court had conceived this new proposition to be
good, and had had it in mind, the decision could have been the same. If the
answer be affirmative, then, however excellent the original proposition may be,
the case is not a precedent for that proposition, but if the answer be negative the
case is a precedent for the original proposition and possibly for other
propositions also .... In short, when a case turns on only one point the
proposition or doctrine of the case, the reason of the decision, the ratio decidendi,
must be a general rule without which the case must have been decided otherwise.
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take into account the judge's expressed reasoning for reaching his
conclusion, not because such reasoning embodied the ratio, but
because it helped reveal the facts the judge considered to be
material.24 For Goodhart, the rationes are the propositions necessary
to the case's outcome, as determined by Wambaugh's test, given the
facts the judge considered material." Goodhart's focus on the judge's
reasoning to determine what is necessary to a case's outcome was
later adopted by scholars to support the notion that the ratio "is the
rule or principle that the precedent-setting court considered to be
necessary for its decision. ' 26 The term "prescriptive" has been
applied to the tests of Wambaugh and Goodhart,27 which look "for

the logically necessary proposition, the rational link between the
judge's view of the facts and his decision. 218 The term "descriptive"
has been applied to Goodhart's critics' approach, which focuses on
what the court considers to be necessary.29 A court determining the
rationes of a prior decision under a prescriptive analysis will look to
what the court did, under a descriptive analysis, to what the court says
it did. The terms "prescriptive" and "descriptive" have not been
adopted by American courts, but they will be used in this Recent
Development to distinguish between tests that emphasize necessity
(prescriptive) and those that do not emphasize necessity (descriptive).
The definition of holding is subject to the same dichotomy
between what a court does and what it claims to do. Chief Justice
John Marshall, in Cohens v. Virginia, 0 defined dicta as expressions
that "go beyond the case" because only the question before the court
supra note 21, at 17-18.
24. Goodhart, supra note 22, at 169-74. Essentially, Goodhart proposed that the facts
identified by the court as relevant to its conclusion are within the universe of the case. See
infra note 82 and accompanying text.
25. Goodhart, supra note 22, at 169; see Thurmon, supra note 19, at 424-25.
26. Charles W. Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical History, 1988 Wis.
L. REV. 771, 799 (1988) (emphasis added); see CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 20, at 72;
Michael S. Moore, Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization, in PRECEDENT IN
LAW 183, 184-88 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987); Thurmon, supra note 19, at 425.
27. Collier, supra note 26, at 799; Thurmon, supra note 19, at 425. Julius Stone first
applied the term "prescriptive" to definitive tests of holding. Julius Stone, The Ratio of
the Ratio Decidendi, 22 MOD. L. REV. 597, 600-01 (1959).
28. Thurmon, supra note 19, at 425.
29. Collier, supra note 26, at 799. Goodhart's critics "focused on his refusal to accept
a judge's expressed reasoning as governing," Thurmon, supra note 19, at 425 (citing
CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 20, at 67-69), and included, most notably, J.L. Montrose
and A.W.B. Simpson. See generally J.L. Montrose, The Ratio Decidendi and the House of
Lords, 20 MOD. L. REV. 124 (1957) (criticizing Goodhart for abandoning the notion that
the ratio was what a court considered to be necessary); A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio
Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. L. REV. 453 (1959) (same).
30. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).

WAMBAUGH,

2003]

GUNS AND DICTUM

is "investigated with care."'"

This definition is muddled.

Its first

component hints at a prescriptive-type test if "expressions within the
case" is defined as expressions necessary to the outcome. The latter
component hints at a descriptive-type test, insofar as it relies on the
degree to which the court focused its attention on a particular
proposition. Focusing on a proposition gives evidence that the court
considered the determination of that proposition to be necessary to
resolve the issue before it, indicating Marshall's emphasis on the
importance of accuracy; only fully considered propositions are
desirable as statements of law.32 Overall, Marshall's characterization

of holding has a descriptive flair. The court, after all, will choose
which propositions to investigate with care, independent of their
prescriptive necessity to the case's outcome.
Nevertheless,
subsequent Supreme Court cases have read a lack-of-necessity
requirement into Marshall's "beyond the case" language, yielding a
prescriptive characterization of holding.33
Marshall's "fully
investigates" language is occasionally reprised, but usually only as a
supplement to the necessity test. 34 Though lack-of-necessity is
required for a proposition to be dictum, the contrapositive is not the
case. Courts have found a proposition to be holding absent its
necessity to a case's outcome, most notably where "there are two
31. Id. at 399-400. Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion,
are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used.
If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the
judgment in a subsequent suit, when the very point is presented for decision. The
reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court is
investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which
may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but
their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.
Id.
32. See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article 111, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000 (1994).
33. E.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996) ("[I]t is not only the
result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are
bound."); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 141 (1981) (characterizing dicta as
propositions that are "unnecessary to the decision"); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441, 454-55 (1972) (finding that a proposition was "unnecessary to the court's decision,
and cannot be considered binding authority"); Sullivan v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 109 U.S.
550, 554 (1883) ("This court should not express an opinion upon [a proposition], unless its
determination is necessarily involved in the adjudication of the case at bar."), aff'd, 143
U.S. 431 (1892); Carroll v. Lessee of Carroll, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 275, 287 (1853) ("[T]here
must have been an application of the judicial mind to the precise question necessary to be
determined to fix the rights of the parties.").
34. See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1935)
(suggesting that both prescriptive and descriptive components should be considered); see
also Dorf, supra note 32, at 1998 (arguing that the holding/dictum distinction should take
into account rationales, rather than just facts and outcomes).
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grounds, upon either of which an appellate court may rest its decision,
and the court adopts both, the 'ruling on neither is obiter.' "I' In such
a situation, neither proposition is necessary, at least not in the strictly
logical sense of Wambaugh's test, but both are nonetheless holding.36
Consider a case where the court has identified the following
propositions: (1) If A then C; (2) If B then C; (3) A; (4) B. The court
concludes that because A and B obtain, C is the proper outcome of
the case, where C is either affirming or reversing the lower court.
According to United States v. Title Insurance & Trust Co. ," A and B

are both holding.38 But under the Wambaugh test, negating A will
result in the same outcome, C, by way of B. Thus, neither A nor B is
strictly necessary to the case's outcome.39 Presumably, a descriptive
justification, inter alia, upholds the Title Insurance rule. Though each

individually is unnecessary to the outcome, presumably both A and B
were fully considered, thus they should qualify as holding.
The Fifth Circuit has echoed the Supreme Court's prescriptive
characterization of holding,4" as well as the Title Insurance
exception. But it gives fuller support for the descriptive aspect of
Marshall's definition by more often emphasizing full consideration,42
and it expands the circumstances in which a proposition can be

holding absent necessity.

Under United States v. Adamson,43 a

35. United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924) (quoting Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Mason City & Ft. Dodge R.R. Co., 199 U.S. 160, 166 (1905)); see also
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,,337 U.S. 535, 537 (1949) (echoing the Title Ins. & Trust
Co. test).
36. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
37. 265 U.S. 472 (1924).
38. See id. at 486.
39. Nota bene, this analysis applies just as well to the two propositions "If A then C"
and "If B then C."
40. United States v. Castillo, 179 F.3d 321, 327 n.9 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Lawson v.
United States, 176 F.2d 49, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1949)), rev'd, 530 U.S. 120 (2000) (characterizing
dictum as "language unnecessary to a decision"); Indiviglio v. United States, 249 F.2d 549,
561 (5th Cir. 1957) ("[N]o opinion can be binding authority unless the case calls for its
expression."), rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 574 (1958).
41. McLellan v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 925 n.21 (5th Cir. 1977) ("It
has long been settled that all alternative rationales for a given result have precedential
value.").
42. Castillo, 179 F.3d at 327 n.9 (noting that dictum is the "opinion of a judge which
does not embody the resolution or determination of the court ... made without argument
or full consideration of the point" (quoting Lawson, 176 F.2d at 51)); In re Cajun Elec.
Power Co-op., Inc., 109 F.3d 248, 256 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that dictum is a proposition
which "being peripheral, may not have received the full and careful consideration of the
court that uttered it" (quoting Sarnoff v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1084 (7th
Cir. 1986))).
43. 665 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1982).
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proposition unnecessary to a case's outcome will be binding
precedent if it is "fully presented and litigated and ... will likely arise
on retrial."44 The Fifth Circuit's Adamson rule provides more latitude
for finding holding on a purely descriptive analysis in situations other
than the Title Insurance exception.
The derivation of the holding/ratio problem can be inferred from
the prescriptive/descriptive distinction reflected in the case law.
Commentators who seize upon opposing definitions of holding and
ratio, one descriptive and one prescriptive, will distinguish the two,45
but otherwise will use them interchangeably.4 6 Given that the
differing definitions of holding and ratio can be explained by the
descriptive/prescriptive distinctions,47 the use of ratio can be dropped,
with the understanding that the term holding suggests both
descriptive and prescriptive components.
Applying the descriptive and prescriptive tests to the
holding/dictum question surrounding Emerson's finding that the
Second Amendment confers an individual right requires a detailed
outline of the court's chain of reasoning. Such an outline will
facilitate the logical manipulation required to test the individual right
proposition both for necessity under the prescriptive test and for
satisfaction of the Title Insurance exception and full consideration
aspects of the descriptive test.
Thus follows a chain of the
determinations the Emerson court made in reversing the dismissal of
the indictment:
1. Because § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) does not require an express
judicial finding of a credible threat, the injunction against
Emerson qualifies under the statute.48
2. Though Emerson was unaware that § 922(g)(8) made it a
crime to possess a firearm while under such an injunction, he
was not deprived of his Fifth Amendment right to Due
Process.49
A. As a general rule, ignorance of the law is no
50
excuse.

44. Id. at 656 n.19.
45. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text; see also sources cited supra note 20
(characterizing ratio descriptively and holding prescriptively).
46. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 18-36 and accompanying text; Collier, supra note 26, at 798-99.
48. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 213-14 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.
Ct. 2362 (2002) (mem.).
49. Id. at 216.
50. Id.
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B. Section 922(g)(8) does not fall into the Lambert v.
Californiaexception to the general rule.5
Congress did not exceed its Article I, Section 8

Commerce Clause powers in enacting § 922(g)(8). 52

4. The Second Amendment recognizes an individual right to
keep and bear arms. 3
A. United States v. Miller does not endorse a collective
right model.54
51. Id. at 215-16. The Lambert exception applies where: "1) the defendant had been
prosecuted for passive activity; 2) the defendant was unaware of the need to register [his
weapon]; 3) circumstances that would have prompted an inquiry into the necessity of
registration were lacking; and 4) an average member of the community would not consider
the punished conduct blameworthy." Id. at 215 (citing Lambert v. California, 355 U.S.
225,228 (1957)).
52. Id. at 217 (citing United States v. Pierson, 139 F.3d 501, 503 (5th Cir. 1998)).
53. Id. at 260.
54. Id. at 226 (referring to United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)). The Emerson
court explains three models of the Second Amendment: (1) the "collective rights" model,
in which "the Second Amendment does not apply to individuals; rather, it merely
recognizes the right of a state to arm its militia," Id. at 218; (2) the "sophisticated
collective rights model," in which an individual right applies only to members of a
"functioning, organized state militia," who bear the arms while participating "in the
organized militia's activities," id. at 219; and (3) the "individual rights" model, which
recognizes "the right of individuals to keep and bear arms," id. at 220. There seems to be
little difference between the first two models. The collective rights model merely refers to
a condition precedent for conferring an individual right, as does the sophisticated
collective rights model. If it does less, the right is, as Dave Kopel wrote in a somewhat
reactionary, though undoubtedly correct manner, "[1]ike collective property in a
Communist country," belonging "to everyone at once in theory, but to only the
government in practice." Dave Kopel, A Right of the People: The Meaning of the
Emerson Decision, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Oct. 25, 2001), at http://www.nationalreview.
com/kopel/ kopelprintl02501.html [hereinafter Kopel, A Right of the People] (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). Hereinafter, "collective right model" will be used to
refer to both model one and model two, as their minor differences are not relevant to the
present discussion.
The Emerson court's steps in concluding that United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174
(1939), did not endorse a collective right model involve multiple determinations that in
concatenation suggest the conclusion, rather than a series of premises leading to a
conclusion. Their necessity as a whole depends entirely on the necessity of determination
4.A. Because each additional determination is of declining marginal argumentative force,
it is difficult to ascertain its necessity individually. Regardless, they are irrelevant to the
analysis.
Emerson's interpretation of Miller, the most recent Supreme Court case on the
Second Amendment, has proven controversial, contrary as it is to many other circuit
courts' interpretations. See Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower
Court Interpretationsof United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L.
REV. 961, 981-98 (1995-1996)
(cataloguing the many and various putative
misinterpretations of Miller); Kenneth E. Barnes, "There Must Be a Limit": U.S. v.
Emerson and the Federal Courts, (forthcoming in THE LONG LIST OF 'GUN CONTROL'
MYTHS, available at http://www.saf.org/pub/rkba/Legal/EmersonSP.html (last visited Nov.
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The text of the Second Amendment suggests it

confers an individual right."
i. "People" refers to individual Americans. 6
ii. "Bear arms" refers generally to the carrying or
wearing of arms, not just in a military context. 7
iii. "Keep arms" refers generally to individuals
keeping arms, not just in a military context. 8
iv. The Second Amendment preamble does not
mandate a collective right interpretation.59
C. The history of the Second Amendment supports the
textual reading.6"

5. Nevertheless, Emerson's individual Second Amendment
right was not violated.61
2, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)) (exhaustively cataloguing lower
court precedent on the Second Amendment).
In Miller, defendants were charged with possession of a sawed-off shotgun in
violation of the National Firearms Act, and they asserted a Second Amendment defense.
Miller, 307 U.S. at 175-77. The district court overturned the indictment citing this defense,
and the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 177, 183. In its brief, the government first argued
that the Second Amendment only protected members of a militia, and the defendants
were not such. Alternatively, it argued that the term "arms" in the Second Amendment
did not include weapons commonly used by criminals, such as sawed-off shotguns.
Emerson, 270 F.3d at 222. The Emerson court concluded that the Miller Court decided the
case based on the second argument, finding that the arms at issue were not covered by the
Second Amendment. Id. at 224. Thus, Emerson concludes, Miller did not endorse a
collective right model. Id. at 226-27. For a glimpse into the debate over the interpretation
of Miller, see Michael C. Dorf, Federal Court of Appeals Says the Second Amendment
Places Limits on Gun Control Legislation (Oct. 31, 2001), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
dorf/20011031.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (arguing that Miller as
interpreted by Lewis v. United States, 455 U.S. 55 (1980), sets a collective right precedent);
Stephen P. Halbrook, Reports of the Death of the Second Amendment Have Been Greatly
Exaggerated: The Emerson Decision, INDEP. INST. (Nov. 19, 2001), at http://www.
independent.org/tii/news/011119Halbrook.html (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (taking the Emerson position); Dave Kopel, Guns in Court,NAT'L REV. ONLINE
(May 30, 2001), at http://www.nationalreview.com/kopel/kopelprint053001. html (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) (taking the Emerson position); Publius, US
Supreme Court Debunks "Gun Control," at http://www.saf.org/pub/rkba/Legal/Debunks.
htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (taking the
Emerson position with vociferous and histrionic glee).
55. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 236.
56. Id. at 229.
57. Id. at 231.
58. Id. at 260.
59. Id. at 233. The preamble of the Second Amendment states: "A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State .... " U.S. CONST. amend. II.
60. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 237.
61. Id. at 263. For a slightly different presentation of the court's chain of reasoning in
reaching this conclusion, see Kopel, A Right of the People, supra note 54.
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A. The Second Amendment individual right is subject
to "limited, narrowly tailored specific exceptions or
restrictions that are reasonable and not inconsistent
with the right of Americans generally to individually
keep and bear their private arms."62

B. Section 922(g)(8) on its face is such a reasonable
restriction, even though it did not require an explicit
finding of a credible threat by the issuing court.63

C. Under § 922(g)(8), as applied to Emerson, the
injunction was sufficient to deprive Emerson of his
Second
Amendment right, "albeit likely minimally
64
SO."

6. Reversed.65
In his concurrence, Judge Parker argues that step four above is
dictum because it is unnecessary to resolve the case.66 His
prescriptive criticism, countered infra,67 errs in dismissing the
possibility that a descriptive evaluation could, particularly in the Fifth
Circuit, 68 justify the individual right determination as holding. First,
the Emerson majority certainly thought step four was holding, stating
that "unless we were to determine the issue of the proper
construction of section 922(g)(8) in Emerson's favor.., resolution of
this appeal requires us to determine the constitutionality of section
922(g)(8). ' 69 The court's assertion that the determination satisfies the
prescriptive test adds descriptive weight: the assertion embodies the
resolution of the court under United States v. Castillo" because the
court identified it as a determination necessary for resolution of the
case, and gives evidence of full consideration under Castillo7' and In
re Cajun Electric Power Co-op, Inc.72 Second, the court more than

62. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 261.
63. Id. at 263.
64. Id. at 265.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 272 (Parker, J., specially concurring).
67. Infra notes 79-119 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (citing Fifth Circuit cases endorsing
the Title Insurance exception and defining dictum as the absence of full consideration).
69. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 264 n.66.
70. 179 F.3d 321, 327 n.9 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d
49, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1949); see supra note 42.
71. Castillo, 179 F.3d at 327 n.9 (quoting Lawson, 176 F.2d at 51); see supra note 42
and accompanying text.
72. 109 F.3d 248, 256 (5th Cir. 1997); see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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satisfied Marshall's "investigates with care 7 3 language, as interpreted
in cases such as Adamson and Humphrey's Executor v. United States;74
its exhaustive Second Amendment analysis (steps four and five
above) covers over forty pages.7"
Finally, the individual right determination falls squarely within
the Title Insurance exception endorsed by both the Supreme Court
and the Fifth Circuit,76 which allows holding designations in the
absence of necessity for descriptive reasons.77 Application of the Title
Insurance framework developed above 78 to the individual right
determination yields the following: (1) If the Second Amendment
confers an individual right, the case is reversed (if A then C, from
steps four and five); (2) If the Second Amendment does not confer an
individual right, the case is reversed (If B then C, assumed by Judge
Parker); (3) The Second Amendment confers an individual right (A,
from step four); (4) Reversed (C, from step six). Obviously the court
cannot determine that the Second Amendment. both does and does
not confer an individual right. It cannot determine both A and B
because B, in this case, is "not A." Determination B, advocated by
Judge Parker, that the Second Amendment does not confer an
individual right, is missing. But Emerson differs from Title Insurance
only in the Emerson court's specification of which determination, A
or B, led to the outcome. Judge Parker's argument would amount to
the following: if the court determined A and "if A then C," yielding
C, A is not holding because the court could have just as easily
determined B and "if B then C," yielding C. But even if the court had
determined all four propositions, both A and B would be holding
under Title Insurance. That the court was more specific-singling out
A and "if A then C" as the sources of outcome C, rather than relying
on both paths to outcome C-gives even stronger indication that A is
holding than the Title Insurance exception alone. If the hypothetical
presence of a collective right determination, B, and its connection to
the same outcome, "if B then C," could not render A dictum, neither
can their absence.
The Emerson court's failure to make
determination B, therefore, does not prevent the application of the
73. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821); see supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
74. 295 U.S. 602 (1935); see supra notes 34, 43 and accompanying text.
75. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 218-60 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.
Ct. 2362 (2002).
76. United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924); McLellan v. Miss.
Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 925 n.21 (5th Cir. 1977).
77. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
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Title Insurance exception, giving further descriptive support to
recognizing Emerson's individual right determination as holding.
The prevalence of the prescriptive test in the case law of both the
Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit79 suggests that descriptive
support for a holding designation is not as strong as prescriptive
support. Because necessity is the most commonly cited requirement
of the prescriptive test,80 to justify a determination as holding on
solely descriptive grounds invites prescriptive disagreement. Only a
test for satisfaction of the narrowest prescriptive definition of holding
will yield universally reliable holding designations. Such a test will be
similar to Wambaugh's test 8 for logical necessity. This Recent
Development proposes a test of logical necessity within the universe
of the case. That is to say, a particular proposition is necessary if
absent that determination the court could not have reached the
ultimate outcome of the case, affirmed or reversed, using only the
remaining facts and legal propositions the court has determined-i.e.,
the only premises available within a case's "universe." Satisfaction of
this test guarantees a prescriptive justification of holding: first,
because logical necessity is a priori the strictest test of any referent of
"necessary"; and second, because allowing all possible premises
outside the universe of the case to determine the necessity of a
determination within the universe of the case would, absurdly,
preclude any determination from being necessary to a case's ultimate
outcome.
Consider the determinations A and "if A then C" within a case,
yielding outcome C. Conceiving a set of alternative determinations
outside the universe of the case, X and "if X then C," will always be
possible, and consideration of such determinations in evaluating the
necessity of "if A then C" will render "if A then C" unnecessary
dictum.82 Internalizing premises outside the universe of the case
would thus prevent a court from proposing a test to resolve a question
with precedential effect because there will always be a possible
hypothetical test which would give the same result.
Thus, Judge Parker's prescriptive criticism is valid only if the
individual right determination is unnecessary under the logical
necessity within the universe of the case test. He suggests that if the
court had not determined that the Second Amendment conferred an
79. See supra notes 33, 40, and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 33, 40, and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 23.
82. Absent "if A then C," outcome C can still be reached via "X" and "if X then C,"
therefore, "if A then C" is unnecessary to the outcome.
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individual right, and instead found a collective right, § 922(g)(8)
would survive scrutiny, and if the court did determine that the Second
Amendment confers an individual right, § 922(g)(8) nonetheless
survives scrutiny.
Therefore, regardless of the individual right
determination, § 922(g)(8) survives Second Amendment scrutiny, and
the individual right determination is not logically necessary to the

holding. 83 According to Judge Parker, § 922(g)(8) "is simply another
example of a reasonable restriction on whatever right is contained in
the Second Amendment."84
Evaluating the individual right determination for necessity

requires fleshing out the logical necessity test. A particular
determination is logically necessary within the universe of the case if
determination of its negation would necessarily not result in the same
outcome, given only the determinations within the universe of the
case (N2).85 This is so because the statement of necessity "if C is the

outcome, then A must have been a determination," yields, by modus
tollens, "if A were not a determination, then C could not be the
outcome" (Ni). 86 Testing A's negation under N2 is the most
83. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 273 (5th Cir. 2001) (Parker, J., specially
concurring), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 2362 (2002) (mem.).
84. Id. at 273 (Parker, J., specially concurring). Judge Parker also supports his
assertion that the individual right determination is dictum with the judicial maxim
requiring federal judges "to avoid constitutional questions when the outcome of the case
does not turn on how [they] answer." Id. at 272. But this maxim does not actually effect
the dictum question. After the court dispenses with step one, the determination that the
injunction falls into § 922(g)(8), it must make some sort of constitutional determination, as
the remaining questions at issue are the Fifth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the
Second Amendment. See id. at 264 n.66. Parker objects to the majority's decision to
specify what type of right the Second Amendment confers, rather than just concluding that
regardless of the type of right conferred, § 922(g)(8) survives scrutiny. See id. at 272-73
(Parker, J., specially concurring). The maxim suggests how a court should reach a
decision: a court should bring as few determinations as possible within the universe of the
case. The majority may have violated the maxim in bringing the individual right
determination within the universe of the case, but since it did so, only the logical necessity
test will determine whether that determination is dictum. The maxim implies two
different points: first, that dictum involving constitutional determinations masked as
holding is worse than dictum not involving constitutional determinations masked as
holding; and second, that if a court has a choice of steps to a particular conclusion, where
one requires fewer logically necessary constitutional determinations than the other, the
former is preferable. The first point applies here if the individual right determination is
dictum, the second if it is not. If, as will subsequently be established, the individual right
determination is necessary, Parker nevertheless retains a critique of the majority's
methodology under the maxim's second point, but loses the dictum criticism.
85. See WAMBAUGH, supra note 21, at 17-18.
86. Modus tollens is a rule of inference of the formal logic stating that from two
previously obtained sentences of the forms "if p then q" and "not q," the sentence "not p"
may be inferred. WILLIAM GUSTASON & DOLPH E. ULRICH, ELEMENTARY SYMBOLIC
LOGIC 100-01 (2d ed. 1989). Thus from any statement "if p then q," a corresponding
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convenient way to determine what outcome must result if A was not a
determination. But note that testing A's negation, in the sense of
determining the outcome if the court actually made the determination
"not A," as Wambaugh suggests,87 is a stricter test than the basic test
of necessity N1, which only requires that if A were not a
determination, C could not be the outcome. Testing within a universe
containing "not A" tests within a specific member of the set of all
universes in which determination A is absent.
Consider the following set of propositions: (1) if A then C; (2)
A; yielding (3) C. Under N1, A is necessary if outcome C could not
obtain if A were removed from the universe of the case. The only
premise available would be "if A then C." The court could not reach
outcome C, unless it relied on determinations that are, from the
perspective of the original case, outside its universe; "if A then C,"
alone, yields nothing. Thus, under N1, A is necessary to outcome C
because absent A, C could not be the outcome using only premises
within the universe of the case. In fact, no outcome could be reached
at all. Under N2, A is necessary if outcome C could not obtain given
substitution of determination "not A" for determination A. Left with
only "not A" and "if A then C," the court, again, could reach no
outcome at all. Because "not A" does not result in the same outcome
as A, A is necessary.
The distinction between N1 and N2 is an antecedent distinction
in that it concerns the meaning of the antecedent "not A" of the ifthen statement "if 'not A' then not C." The distinction derives from
the interpretation of the negation of A in the operation of modus
tollens upon the basic statement of necessity "if outcome C obtains, A
was determined."
Under N1, A's negation is only a negative
existential statement taking A outside the universe of the case: it is
not the case that A was determined. Under N2, A's negation involves
a negative existential statement taking A outside the universe of the
case coupled with a positive existential statement bringing the
determination "not A" within the universe of the case. N2's positive
existential statement is unwarranted by the formal logic because
modus tollens will only negate the positive existential statement "A
was determined." N1 is the actual test of necessity. N2 is a
convenient, though imperfect, proxy for N1 in most cases. Note,
however, that if a court makes the additional determination "we must

sentence "if 'not q' then 'not p' " can be derived and by transposition, a rule of
replacement, the latter sentence may be substituted for the former. Id. at 102.
87. WAMBAUGH, supra note 21, at 17-18; see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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determine either 'not A' or A," N2 becomes a perfect proxy for N1;
removal of A from the universe of the case effects the imposition of
"not A" into the universe of the case via the existential disjunction
"A must be determined or 'not A' must be determined" and its result
by the rule of implication88 "if A is not determined then 'not A' must
be determined." But reliance on "either 'not A' or A must be
determined" to justify the positive existential component of N2's
interpretation of A's negation (i.e., bringing "not A" within the
universe of the case) raises the ominous specter of whether a
determination made by the court, which is itself unnecessary and
therefore dictum, as the " 'not A' or A" determination must be,89 can
be used to buttress the necessity of another statement. As will be
discussed further below,9" a determination such as "A or 'not A' " if
sufficiently implicit in the court's reasoning or mandated by
precedent, should be allowed within the universe. Regardless, N2
and N1 need be distinguished only if a determination fails N2, i.e., if
"not A" yields the same outcome as A.91
A particular outcome C, such as reversed, has a perfect
complement in its opposite outcome, affirmed. Why is the "no
outcome" result allowed to satisfy N1/N2? Why does necessity not
require that "not A" necessarily result in outcome, "not C," in the
sense of C's opposite and complete complement, affirmed, rather
than merely requiring that determination "not A" not result in
outcome C? The simple answer is that for A to be necessary to C, it
must only be the case that A's absence from the universe prevents the
court from reaching C-that is simply what necessity means. That
situations arise where neither could "not C" be reached should not be
of concern. But the concern over C's complement supplies a safe
harbor test for necessity, stricter than N1/N2. Under the safe harbor
(N3), A is necessary if absent A, or given the determination "not A,"
the opposite outcome, "not C," would necessarily-be reached. N3 is a
safe harbor because its satisfaction guarantees satisfaction of N1/N2,
but satisfaction of N1/N2 does not guarantee satisfaction of N3. Thus,
88. Implication is a rule of replacement of the formal logic stating that any sentence of
the form " 'not p' or q" may be replaced by a corresponding sentence of the form "if p
then q." GUSTASON & ULRICH, supra note 86, at 102.
89. The " 'not A' or A" determination is unnecessary because absence of "either A
must be determined or not A must be determined" still allows outcome C via A and "if A
then C."
90. Infra text accompanying note 92.
91. This will only be the case where the determination "if 'not A' then C" is allowed
within the universe, and determination "A or 'not A,' " necessary to bring "not A" into
the case under N1,and thus to reach C, is not.
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N3 can be used 'as an imperfect proxy for N1/N2, necessitating a
resort to N1/N2 only when a proposition fails N3. The distinction
between N1/N2 and N3 is a consequent distinction, in that it concerns
the meaning of the consequent "not C" of the if-then statement "if
'not A' then 'not C.' "
The "no outcome" problem suggests another germane concern.
When, if ever, might it be permissible to go outside the universe of
the case to test a determination's necessity? Or, how explicit must a
court be about a proposition to justify its inclusion within the universe
of the case? Consider again the following set of determinations: (1)
if A then C; (2) A; yielding (3) C. Determination A fails N3 because
neither removal of A from the universe nor removal coupled with the
addition of "not A" to the universe necessitates "not C." N1 and N2
are satisfied because, under either, no result could be reached at all.
But assume that a certain proposition, "if 'not A' then C," was a
priori self-evident or a clear binding rule of precedent such that a
court would be forced to apply it after determining "not A." Assume
further that the absence of A from the universe of the case renders
the determination "not A" equally mandated, as in the case described
above92 where the court is bound by precedent to decide either A or
"not A" by virtue of, for example, a particular question's
conventional split between two (and only two) resolutions. If, given
the absence of A, the court would be forced to determine "not A"
and "if 'not A' then C," a good argument exists for allowing both "not
A" and "if 'not A' then C" into the universe. If these determinations
are allowed, the court could reach the same outcome, C, in the
absence of A, and thus A would be unnecessary dictum.
What sort of propositions should be brought into the universe of
the case? The prescriptive test for holding, by emphasizing necessity,
evaluates what a court will be forced to do given the absence of the
determination tested and the operation of the premises remaining
within the universe. It follows that any proposition outside the
universe of the case as decided that the court would be forced to
apply if the determination tested were removed should be brought
within the universe of the case. Precedent dictates what propositions
a court would be forced to apply.93 Therefore, precedent binding
upon a court will be allowed within the universe. As a result,
precedent from higher courts will be the best candidates for

92. Supra note 90 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. Sch. Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 321 (5th Cir. 1970)
(stating that "a decision of a higher court is binding as precedent").
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inclusion,94 followed by cases from the same court, which are firmly
entrenched." Only precedent that a court could not overturn will
exert the requisite force upon the court's decision. If a court is in a
position to overturn a particular precedent, a court would not then be
bound to apply it, and thus it should not be allowed within the
universe. In a sense, unambiguous precedents binding upon a court
form a set of axioms freely reachable for inclusion within the universe
of a case before that court.
This Recent Development proceeds by evaluating several of the
Emerson court's determinations, under the tests outlined above, to
flesh out the types of situations where such extra-universal premises
might be allowed, before testing the individual right determination
based on the rubric developed. To summarize, three tests will be
applied:
(Ni) If it is true that if A is not a determination then C
cannot be the outcome, A is necessary. If proposition A
fails N1, it is not necessary to the outcome;
(N2) If it is true that if "not A" is a determination then C
cannot be the outcome, A is necessary. If proposition A
fails N2, proceed to Ni;
(N3) If it is true that if A is not a determination or "not A"
is a determination then "not C" is the outcome, A is
necessary. If proposition A fails N3, proceed to N2.96
In Emerson the ultimate outcome (C) was reversal of the district
court.97 In step one, the court determined that the injunction against
Emerson qualified under the statute (A). 98 This determination will be

holding under N3 if the opposite determination would necessitate the
opposite outcome, affirmation. If the court had determined that the
statute did not cover Emerson's injunction, it is inarguable that the
district court's dismissal must be affirmed (not C). 99 If Emerson's

94. See, e.g., id. (stating that "a decision of a higher court is binding as precedent").
95. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854
(1992) (stating that the Supreme Court must follow its own precedent unless the prior
ruling is clearly in error); Cargill, Inc. v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 615 F.2d 212, 215 (5th
Cir. 1980) ("We are bound by the former decisions of this court."); Whatley v. United
States, 428 F.2d 806, 807 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that the court is bound by previous Fifth
Circuit decisions).
96. Supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
97. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct.
2362 (2002) (mem.); see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
98. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 213-14; see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
99. See United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999), rev'd 270 F.3d
203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002) (mem.).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

activities are not covered by the statute, he cannot be indicted under
it. The subsequent inquiries in steps two through five could be
dismissed. Because substitution of "not A" for A yields "not C," A is
necessary under N3. The intermediary premise asserting that a
defendant whose conduct falls outside the statute cannot be indicted
under the statute, however, is not contained within the opinion. It is
outside the universe. But the required intermediary premise is so
deeply-rooted in judicial common sense, and the common law, that
for the court to ignore it and assert that Emerson be punished under a
statute that does not cover his conduct would fly in the face of deeplyrooted clear binding precedent.1"' The court would have no such
option; it must recognize the intervening premise. The premise can
be brought within the universe of the case for the purpose of testing
necessity, and given "not A," the court would be forced to conclude
"not C." Thus A is necessary under N3. This is the sort of selfevident intermediary premise that demands inclusion in the universe
of the case. Clear binding rules of precedent, then, which under no
circumstances could be rationally overturned, form a set of axioms
accessible from any case's universe.
In step two, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Emerson's Fifth
Amendment right was not violated (A).10 1 Under N3, if the court had
determined that the right had been violated (not A), by finding that
his actions fell into the Lambert exception to the rule that ignorance
of the law is no excuse, such determination would entail upholding
the district court (not C). Again, the notion that a court must dismiss
an indictment that violates a defendant's Fifth Amendment Due
Process right is firmly entrenched binding precedent that the court
must apply." 2 In fact, for the court to ignore the intermediary
premise in this situation would violate the more general mandate of
Marbury v. Madison10 3 that a right infringed by a law repugnant to the
Constitution must be remedied by a court's voiding of the law as
applied to the defendant.'04 This intermediary premise too requires
inclusion in the universe of the case, and under N3, the step two
100. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963) (holding that where a
criminal statute is inapplicable to defendants for interfering with activities protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, defendants cannot be held liable under the
statute).
101. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 217; see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228-30 (1957) (dismissing
defendant's indictment under a statute requiring felons to register with the city of Los
Angeles because the statute violated Due Process clause notice requirements).
103. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
104. Id. at 176-77.
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determination is holding because determination of "not A" yields
"not C."
The N3 analysis of step three's Commerce Clause
determination °5 yields the same result: it is holding on admission to
the universe of the irrefutable premise that a defendant cannot be
indicted on a statute that violates the Commerce Clause. The court
could not have affirmed an indictment under a statute that violates
The intermediary premise is firmly
the Commerce Clause.
entrenched in binding precedent, 10 6 and ignoring it would violate the
general mandate of Marbury.'°7
Viewed as a single unit, steps' four and five determination that
Emerson's Second Amendment right has not been violated is holding
under N3 on admission to the universe of the equally mandated
premise that an indictment in violation of the Second Amendment
must be dismissed." 8 The question is whether the intermediate steps
in reaching that determination, especially the step four individual
right determination (A), is holding. It is holding under the N3 safe
harbor if inclusion within the universe of its contrary determination, a
collective right (not A),'019 logically entails the opposite outcome,
affirmation of the district court (not C). This is obviously not the
case, because a collective right determination by no means logically
entails affirming the district court's reversal of the indictment. No
precedent mandates the necessary intermediary premise-that
§ 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment under a collective right
interpretation. Because the court is not constrained by precedent, it
has the option to affirm given a collective right determination.
Because "not A" does not entail "not C," the determination fails N3.
Failing N3, the individual right determination must be evaluated
under N2.
Under N2, the determination is necessary if determination of a
collective right (not A) could not result in the same outcomeaffirmation (not C). The determination will fail N2 only by inclusion
105. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 217; see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995)

(reversing

defendant's conviction under the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 for possession of a
handgun at his school because the Act violated the Commerce Clause).
107. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.

108. Though no recent cases have found a law to violate the Second Amendment,
presumably Marbury's mandate that a court must void an unconstitutional law applies.
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.

109. The actual negation of the individual right determination is "the Second
Amendment does not confer an individual right." Because the court was essentially
choosing between the individual right and collective right models, Emerson, 270 F.3d at
218-21, testing a collective right determination as a particular iteration of the set of
possibilities created by denying the individual right determination makes sense.
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within the universe of a premise asserting that § 922(g)(8) survives
Second Amendment scrutiny under a collective right interpretation,
allowing the court to affirm (C) given a collective right (not A). Only
inclusion of such a premise will allow a collective right finding to
result in reversal; otherwise a collective right finding will have no
premise to operate upon, and no result could be reached at all. The
majority makes no mention of such a premise,1 1 ° though Judge Parker
certainly would agree with it."' The question, then, is whether this is
the sort of premise that requires inclusion within the universe of the
case. The analysis above" 2 requires inclusion only where a court is
forced by precedent to find C given "not A."
Note, first, that there is no such precedent binding the court.
The question of whether the Second Amendment conferred an
individual right or a collective right was one of first impression in the
Fifth Circuit." 3 Given that no court would decide the effects of a
collective right without first determining the existence of a collective
right, it follows that no Fifth Circuit precedent mandates how the
collective right interpretation should be applied to a statute. Nor
does any Supreme Court precedent control how the collective right
interpretation would be applied in this case. United States v. Miller
was decided, according to the Emerson court, not based on a
particular interpretation of the Second Amendment right, but on the
meaning of the term "arms."" ' 4 Of course, it may be suspect to use
the Emerson court's characterization of Miller to justify the notion
that the court was not bound by Miller to find that § 922(g)(8) would
survive scrutiny under a collective right interpretation. After all,
insofar as this characterization is necessary, and thus holding, only if
the individual right determination is necessary, to justify the necessity
of the individual right determination via a characterization whose
necessity is contingent upon the very point it is used to approve may
be circular. But even ignoring the court's characterization of Miller, if
Miller did endorse a collective right interpretation it still would not
mandate the effect of that interpretation on the validity of
§ 922(g)(8). In validating the statute at issue, Miller pointed only to
an absence of evidence "tending to show that possession or use of a
'shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length' at this
110.
65 and
111.
112.
113.
114.

The absence of such a premise is shown in the chain outline. See supra notes 48accompanying text.
See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 273 (Parker, J., specially concurring).
Supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 264 n.66.
Id. at 224; see supra note 54.
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time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well-regulated militia."'' 5 This relationship is a far cry
from the reasonable relationship of § 922(g)(8)'s proscription of "any
firearm or ammunition""' 6 to such preservation. The laconic Miller
Court gave no indication of how such a reasonable relationship would
be determined," 7 and it certainly left no mandate as to the application
of a collective right interpretation comparable to the mandates
forcing inclusion of the premises discussed supra.' 8 Thus, given the
absence of any Supreme Court case endorsing a collective right
interpretation, or, at least, the absence of any case stipulating the
effect of such interpretation, no Supreme Court precedent could
control Emerson's application of a collective right interpretation to
§ 922(g)(8).
With no binding precedent mandating its decision, the Emerson
court would be free to affirm under a collective right interpretation.
Because the required intermediary premise cannot be included in the
universe of the case, the individual right finding is necessary under
N2, and thus is holding. For a subsequent court to find the
determination dictum, it would have to assert that the Emerson court,
given binding precedent, had no choice but to find that § 922(g)(8)
survived scrutiny under a collective right interpretation. Given the
lack of binding precedent, this assertion is simply not the case. The
majority gives no indication how it would have applied a collective
Perhaps Emerson's great-great-greatright interpretation.
grandpappy was a minuteman and the minuteman code says the
great-great-great-grandson of a minuteman is a minuteman. The
universe lacks contrary determinations of fact that might suggest a
particular treatment under a collective right. The court may further
have decided that in limiting the coverage of the Second Amendment
right to militiamen, the class of narrowly tailored exceptions should
be otherwise narrowed, and thus that the issuing court's failure to
make a particularized finding renders § 922(g)(8) as applied to
Emerson violative of the Second Amendment, allowing the court to
affirm. Such a decision may seem a bit farfetched, but the court
would have been free to so find, or to find a violation of the Second
Amendment under a collective right in some other way. The
intermediary premise necessary to conclude that the collective right
finding would result in reversal is not forced upon the court, as was,
115.
116.
117.
118.

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) (2000).
Miller, 307 U.S at 182.
Supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
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for example, affirming upon finding that Emerson's Fifth
Amendment right was violated." 9 For the court to find a collective
right and simultaneously affirm the trial court's dismissal would
certainly have been unusual.
But insertion of the required
intermediary premise based on mere speculation about the likelihood
of the outcome given a collective right finding effectively robs the
Emerson court of the ability to determine a method for analyzing how
the statute would be evaluated under a collective right interpretation,
which would have been within its discretion had it determined a
collective right.
Allowing mere speculations on what a court would or should do
given the absence of a particular premise within the universe of the
case would make it much easier for subsequent courts to find
determinations dicta. Under Judge Parker's reasoning, 210 any time a
court could use either of two possible tests' to resolve a question, it
must apply both or risk the test applied being labeled dictum via
speculation that the same outcome would have been reached under
the alternative test. If under each analysis the same outcome is
reached, the court could not indicate which analysis is correct, for this
would be dictum under the logical necessity test. Proposing a test to
resolve a question with precedential effect would be much more
difficult. Only if all the tests the court considers are applied and one
gives a unique result would a test be holding. Fewer tests for
resolving questions would be consistently applied because fewer tests
would be holding. As a result, one of the goals of precedent, that

119. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
120. The dissent's reasoning, interestingly enough, is echoed by Michael C. Dorf, the
same Michael C. Dorf who advocated a broader view of holdings that takes rationales into
account. Compare Dorf, supra note 54 ("The court's result meant that it did not really
have to reach the question of whether Emerson had Second Amendment rights in the first
place. After all, even assuming he did, the court had found the government's interest
overrode them."), with Dorf, supra note 32, at 2034 ("[lit would be a gross
misunderstanding of Gates to term its entire discussion of the totality of the circumstances
dictum. As in Roe, so in Gates, a different rationale for the decision reached by the Court
may have been plausible, but that does not change the actual rationale of the case."). The
Second Amendment does funny things to people. For arguments supporting the
majority's view, see David I. Caplan, A Wrong Turn on Second Amendment Rights (Jan. 7,
2002), at http://www.law.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Kopel, A
Right of the People,supra note 54.
121. By "tests," the author simply means the method by which a question is resolved.
For example, to determine if § 922(g)(8) violated the Second Amendment, the Emerson
court tested under an individual right rubric. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 236,
263 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002) (mem.).
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"like cases be treated alike,"' 12 2 would be eroded. It may be argued
that few cases exist in which the court considers and rejects
alternative tests for resolving a question. Even if this were the case,
to allow inclusion within the universe of the effect of a considered
test's application (i.e., inclusion of "if 'not A' then C"), is not a far cry
from allowing within the universe any speculatively plausible test the
court might have considered, had it not applied the test it did, if it
plausibly could result in the same outcome (such as inclusion of both
"B" and "if B then C"). Such an inclusion simply involves two
speculations as to likelihood rather than one. And if this double
speculation is allowed, any test a court proffers for analyzing a
question could be rendered dictum by inventing a plausible test that
would give the same result. Precedent would not just be eroded, but
virtually destroyed, for to cement as holding a test for resolving a
question a court would have to go through every plausible rubric for
resolving the question and find one that gives a unique result.
Though courts tend not to engage in the explicit analyses of
necessity developed above, they do tend to consider a proposed test
holding even when an alternative test would likely yield a similar
result, further dispelling the notion that Emerson's individual right
finding is dictum. The Emerson majority wrote of its individual right
finding, "in reaching that issue we have only done what the vast
majority of other courts faced withsimilar contentions have done
(albeit our resolution of that question is different)."' 2 3 The court had
in mind the numerous circuit court cases which have determined, as
putative holding, that Miller endorsed a collective right interpretation
and, thus, that the Second Amendment afforded no protection in the
instant case. 24 But under Judge Parker's rationale, because in many
of these cases an individual right determination would result in the
same outcome, the determinations are dictum.

122. See Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish?
Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a
Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 777-81 (1995) (discussing the consistency virtues
of precedent); Frederick Schauer, Precedent,39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572-73 (1987) (same).
For a detailed argument that dictum/holding determinations should give special
significance to the rationales of prior cases and an account of the danger a narrow
definition of holding poses to stare decisis, see generally Dorf, supra note 32.
123. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 264 n.66.
124. See, e.g., Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 122 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
Second Amendment confers a collective right); Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149

(6th Cir. 1971) (holding that the Second Amendment confers a collective right). For a list
of such cases, see Emerson,270 F.3d at 218 n.10; Barnes, supra note 54.
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In addition, the United States Supreme Court has developed
tests for the constitutionality of an activity and nevertheless found
that the challenged activity survives scrutiny, or, as Dave Kopel more
elegantly put it, has "spelled out a binding rule of law without
handing the challenger a victory.' 12 5 In both cases, the determination
subsequently was cited as binding precedent. In Strickland v.
Washington,'26 the Supreme Court held that the proper standard for
attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance, and
because defense counsel's strategy was reasonable, the defendant's
death penalty conviction stood and the lower court was reversed.'27
The Court could have defined a much stricter standard for attorney
performance, which would have likewise resulted in reversal.
Nevertheless, the Strickland rule subsequently has been cited as
binding precedent.2 8
In Jackson v. Virginia,12 9 the Supreme Court found that to satisfy
Due Process, the state must prove every element of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, and that the evidence nonetheless showed that a
rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of murder
beyond a reasonable doubt. 30 Again, the Court proffered a test to
adduce the constitutionality of a certain act and found that the act
passed the test where numerous other possible tests could have
rendered the same result. The Jackson rule subsequently has been
cited as binding precedent.'
Dropping the "within the universe of
the case" requirement from the logical necessity test would allow, in
both Strickland and Jackson, inclusion of intermediary premises
linking the stricter tests to the same outcome, rendering their
constitutional determinations dicta. In both of these cases, there are
multiple paths open to the Court that could yield the same result, yet
the Court's decision to establish a particular test became binding
precedent. By the same token, Emerson's finding that the Second
Amendment should be tested under an individual right rubric is
binding precedent in the Fifth Circuit.
When courts make precedent, they establish methods as well as
results.132 Encompassed within a holding is some degree of the

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Kopel, A Right of the People, supra note 54.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 694-701.
Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 200 (2001).
443 U.S. 307 (1979).
Id. at 324-25.
Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 285 (1992).
See Dorf, supra note 32, at 2033-36; Thurmon, supra note 19, at 423-36.
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method utilized in reaching a particular end. If the only precedential
information a court could glean from prior cases were the
particularized holding from a particular set of facts, precedent would
not be very helpful to courts resolving issues which, though similar,
proffer variant facts. Any time a court establishes a test, a plausible
alternative test could have resulted in the same outcome, but the test
the court actually chooses nonetheless has, and should have,
precedential weight.
Allowing only determinations within the
universe of the case and determinations mandated by clear binding
precedent to establish the necessity of a proposition creates a brightline test that allows a court to develop a precedential analysis for
resolving an issue, but nonetheless excludes truly unnecessary
determinations.
Emerson's determination that the Second Amendment confers
an individual right is holding under either a descriptive or prescriptive
analysis, despite Judge Parker's claim that it is "entirely
unnecessary." It is logically necessary to the outcome as tested within
the universe of the case, and thus meets the strictest possible
prescriptive test of holding. Case law from both the Supreme Court
and the Fifth Circuit suggests that the determination satisfies
descriptive justifications for holding as well. The determination is
placed within the logical construct of the case in a manner
comparable to Supreme Court cases' determinations subsequently
cited as binding precedent. The determination is holding and
constitutes precedent in the Fifth Circuit.
STEPHEN

E. RYAN

